Negotiations Drain People's War

Why did the U.S. government want negotiations? U.S. rulers weren't interested in "peace" talks just in order to work out the details of a "good" settlement. Much more was involved. In fact, they hoped the very process of negotiating would help curb the revolutionary initiative of peasants and workers and thereby stifle people's war. And that's just what happened.

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As we mentioned, in January 1967 DRV/NLF leaders back-slid for the first time on the question of talks. They said publicly that talks could start when the U.S. unconditionally halted the bombing. Then, one year later, the Vietnamese leaders retreated again. An unconditional bombing halt, they now said, "will automatically lead to discussions" (Le Monde, 1/6/68). From "could start" to "will start."

This 1968 position -- automatic negotiations -- produced quite an uproar. Within four months, preliminary talks had begun. Let's see how this took place.

Just one month after the "will automatically talk" statement, NLF and DRV troops launched the now famous Tet Offensive of 1968. They seized major cities, provincial capitals, and medium-sized and small towns all over the south. Fighting was furious. Rank-and-file Vietnamese revolutionaries carried out collective deeds of heroism rarely equaled. Day after day, in cities like Hué, under ferocious U.S. government bombing and shock-troop assault, the revolutionaries held firm. Very few prisoners were taken from their ranks.

Supporters of the Vietnamese working people were greatly moved. It seemed that the revolutionaries were about to win! If only they could hold out …

But they didn't. Position after ,position was re-taken. The working class heroes who held the U.S.'s Saigon embassy were soon wiped out to a man. Hué fell. The U.S. claimed that tens of thousands of revolutionaries had died.

TET: A TALE OF TWO NEWS STORIES

On February 7, 1968, during the Tet Offensive, Le Monde reported an NLF call for a "general uprising" in south Vietnam. Three days later, the same paper carried an interview with the DRV's foreign minister. He said talks could start right away once the U.S. stopped bombing the north.

Think about this. Doesn't it sound weird? NFL/DRV leaders really expected the general uprising to take place then why would they call for talks during the very Tet Offensive that was supposed to culminate in that uprising?

In other words, which of the two positions -- the "call" for talks or the "call" for overthrowing the U.S. -- which of the two contradictory "calls" was put forward honestly?

This is an important question. To understand it better, let's consider the place of "general offensives" and "general uprisings" in the theory and practice of People's War.

The theory of People's War, as put forth by Vietnamese leaders, involves three distinct stages. Here is a description by the famous DRV general, Vo Nguyen Giap:

A war of this nature in general entails several phases ... Starting from the stage of contention, it goes through a period of equilibrium before arriving at a general counter-offensive ... Only a long-term war could enable us to utilize to the maximum our political trump cards ... to transform our weakness into strength. (People's Army, People's War, Hanoi, 1961, p. 29)

This makes sense. Technical superiority, air and sea power for instance, lies with imperialists, The strength of workers and peasants can only lie in the revolutionary efforts of the oppressed fighting their oppressors. "Transform weakness into strength!" In the early phases, the people's forces are small, disorganized, without weapons, because their supporters, the working people, are oppressed, divided, deprived of modern weapons. But the class knowledge of millions of workers and peasants, their understanding that imperialism, their oppressor, must be smashed -- this knowledge can turn workers and peasants into a vast army, a net with a million loops to snarl and confound, to snag and strangle the rulers.

The imperialists get rich by keeping most people down. That is why they're weak.

Of necessity, this is a long, drawn out war. Before the people's forces can rise to a higher level, they must fully develop the people's initiative on the present level. Everything must be rooted in the people, for they are the only support. Thus, of course, the highest level of struggle, the actual period of "general counter -offensive," requires the full mobilization of workers and peasants, very clear on exactly what must be done, thoroughly organized. And before the actual "general counter-offensive" begins. the imperialists must be all worn out, their reserves gone. They must be in total retreat. Truong Chinh, another DRV leader, described this stage as follows:

(in this stage) our consistent aim is that the whole country should rise up and go over to the offensive on all fronts, completely defeat the enemy ... (The Resistance Will Win, Hanoi, 1960, pp. 149-153)

Does this sound familiar? It sounds like the general uprising that the DRV/NLF leaders "called" for when Tet started. But,` as we can see, while the leaders called for an uprising and engaged in a vast and very costly offensive as if an uprising could take place, they really never expected that uprising. They knew better than anyone that they were nowhere near the final stage of people's war.

But why issue an absurd call for a general uprising, mount a massive but hopeless offensive, and then, 3 days later at the peak of the offensive, call for talks? The mind boggles.

FATAL BLOW OR NEGOTIATIONS BLUFF?

In an official statement, in April 1968, the DRV claimed that:

The generalized offensive and uprising of the South Vietnam armed forces and people (during Tet) early this year have inflicted on the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys a fatal blow. Nothing can save from collapse the puppet administration and army, props of U.S. neocolonialism in South Vietnam. Nothing can save the U.S. aggressors from a total defeat. (Boston Globe, 4/3/88; emphasis added)

This statement was made after Tet. By that time anyone could see this was an outright lie. There was no "fatal blow." Why would the NLF/ DRV leaders lie?

Perhaps it wasn't a he-Perhaps they didn't know! But how could that be?

The Vietnamese leaders have vast resources for information; lead a million strong national Liberation Front, an organization which is everywhere. They know just how the fighting is going. When they said the U.S. was finished in Vietnam, they knew they were talking nonsense.

SO WHY WOULD THEY LIE?

Because Tet was not, as they said, an attempt to seize power. The clue is that weird second "call," mentioned earlier, the DRV foreign minister's call for immediate talks. Because, far from

being a truly revolutionary act, Tet was in fact a gigantic bluff, a negotiating tactic, a big show aimed at convincing the U.S. to begin talks right away. The leaders threw tens of thousands of the best troops against U.S.-held cities. On the one hand., they publicly threatened total uprising. This was meant to maintain the morale of the NLF and its supporters. On the other hand, they told the U.S. the real story: "we're willing to talk; you know and we know we can't win now. But if you don't talk soon, we'll cause you great political embarrassment in the U.S. by indicting heavy losses by staging suicide offensives like Tet.''

Johnson got the point. He answered with a " gesture: on Feb. 9 he called a bombing halt. This was hardly enough for the DRV/ NLF leaders. To show their dissatisfaction they increased pressure on the U.S. stronghold Khesanh, under bitter siege at the time.

Rumors flew. Then, on March 31, LBJ made his famous "peace" speech. He wouldn't run again. He'd limit bombing to the 20^th parallel and below--that is, to the southern part of the DRV.

At first the DRV labeled this a farce. (N.Y. Times, 4/3/68-) Even Fulbright attacked LBJ. The Vietnamese leaders would never accept such a phony offer, he said. (Boston Globe, 4/2/68.)

He spoke too soon. The DRV abruptly changed its stand, declaring its willingness to start preliminary talks right away so that a full-scale bomb-halt could occur and regular negotiations begin.

U.S. officials said privately they were "flabbergasted" that Hanoi had agreed to contact with the United States in response to President Johnson's move ... Hanoi's offer was regarded as a significant tactical concession. (New York Times, 4/4/68)

What a lot of wheeling and dealing, what a lot of scheming instead of revolutionary struggle. But the worst Part of it all was: although the Tet offensive was just part of a sellout maneuver to pressure Johnson, nevertheless it was no game. Many thousands of revolutionaries were slaughtered. They never had a chance.

HANOI BENDS OVER BACKWARDS

The terms of Johnson's offer were an insult, even when compared to Hanoi's sellout "automatic negotiations position" of January l968; That is, there wasn't even a real bomb halt. The quantity of bombs dropped was to remain the same. The only thing was they'd now be dropped all in one area, the southern portion of the DRV!

Even these miserable terms were not observed by the U.S. Thus bombing was supposed to be limited to the southern DRV, yet areas in the northern sections were bombed. On a visit to Hanoi, CBS overseas reporter R. Collingwood asked DRV leader Pham Van Dong about this. Collingwood reported that:

Hanoi would not be diverted by small incidents or minor contradictions between American actions and what they interpret as American words. (N.Y. Times, 4/7/68, our emphasis).

FROM PEOPLE'S WAR TO WAR OF NEGOTIATIONS

The Vietnam war has changed. Graphs showing the intensity of fighting since the Tet offensive (Feb. '68) make it clear that battles and lulls in the fighting are planned to achieve various negotiations aims, and, eventually, a deal. Here are some examples:

The winter 1968 Tet offensive, the Khesanh siege and the let-up of that siege, were all geared to achieving the preliminary talks that began in spring 1968.

Full-fledged talks started in November 1968. Before these began, NLF/DRV leaders launched a number of highly sensational battles. Later we'll discuss how these battles were linked to turning points in the negotiations hassle.

Since Nov. 1968, NLF/DRV leaders have mainly emphasized restraint. Thus the first post-Nov. '68 lull lasted 4 months! These lulls (2 years of lulls?) are intended to present a good image. This, the NLF/DRV leaders apparently hope, will pressure the U.S. to negotiate in good faith.

Despite the lulls, various sensational, mini-Tets have been launched. Thus, as we discuss later, in March, 1969 an offensive was launched aimed at "criticizing" Nixon's current "get tough" policy. Another offensive was launched in 1969 to celebrate the formation of the Provisional Revolutionary Government (by the NLF and others). And so on. The main thing (especially this past year, including during the Cambodian invasion) has been the incredible lack of fighting in Vietnam.

Let's examine more thoroughly the relationship of fighting to talks starting in 1968. But let us state clearly from the outset our political conclusions. The NLF/DRV leaders' approach completely undermines People's War. The strategy of the NLF/DRV leaders constitutes a terrible, criminal attack on Vietnamese -- on all! -- working people.

Consider the siege at Khesanh. NLF/DRV troops had thousands trapped in this U.S. stronghold. Things were so tight that LBJ made his generals promise not to lose. And yet the siege was lifted after LBJ's "peace speech" in order to demonstrate Vietnamese leaders' sincerity.

That was how things went -- moves and counter-moves, like a chess game. In early May the preliminary talks actually started. To bolster their negotiating position, DRV/NLF leaders launched a second 1968 offensive. Thus the talks began in the week of highest U.S. casualties that year.

The third NLF/DRV offensive took place during the infamous 1968 Democratic Party convention in Chicago. That NLF/DRV offensive was meant to build support for McCarthy by embarrassing LBJ and Humphrey.

Or consider the other side of the coin: when NLF/DRV leaders thought a planned military offensive might harm talks, they pulled back. Thus around Christmas, 1968, the puppet ruler Thieu threatened to cease talks if the NLF carried out an offensive it was preparing for around Saigon. U.S. Paris negotiator Cyrus Vance warned the DRV of the same thing. (N.Y. Times, 12/22/68.) The NLF offensive never took place.

And again -- on April 10, 1969, the N.Y. Times reported that certain secret talks were bogged down. Sure enough, on April 12 the NLF launched a small offensive -- attacking 45 targets. Various categories of negotiational events called forth various levels of military action.

One could go on and on. Vietnamese leaders themselves have pretty much admitted their strategy:

We are convinced that there can be no better stimulation to promote the Paris talks than repeated blows against the U.S. expeditionary corps, and we are acting accordingly. That is the way to bring back peace (Article from DRV "Communist" party press, signed "Victorious" and reprinted in N.Y. Times, 3/23/69; our emphasis).

FULL-FLEDGED TALKS -- ANOTHER RETREAT

Let's go briefly over the history of the negotiations maneuvers:

1966: Vietnamese leaders still upheld 4 points including total U.S. withdrawal as precondition for talks.

1967: 4 points dropped as precondition. Unconditional bombing halt new preconditions for talks.

Jan. 1968: Vietnamese leaders now said talks "will automatically follow" an unconditional bombing halt.

April; 1968: LBJ confined bombs to southern DRV. A sheer farce. DRV leaders scoffed, yet then agreed to preliminary talks aimed at achieving unconditional bombing halt.

On Nov. 1, 1968, a new page in this backsliding story was printed. LBJ announced that the long-sought "full-fledged" talks could begin. There would still be several months of haggling over table-shapes (!), but, in essence, this was the real thing. This wee what the NLF/DRV leaders had sought.

The DRV/NLF leaders had maintained (as of April, 1968) that full-fledged talks could not begin until an unconditional bombing halt was declared. One would suppose this was the basis of the agreement to begin these talks. One would be wrong. In fact, LBJ (who announced the talks) made it very clear the bombing halt and the talks were both highly conditional. So what was the condition? "Just" that NLF/DRV leaders not "take advantage" of the bomb halt or "escalate" the fight.

In order to get negotiations with U.S. Imperialism, these leaders had promised not to let the people fight too hard, to make sure People's War did not grow too strong, that it atrophied!

Shame! What a bitter betrayal.

And what a paradox. Consider. Just 9 months earlier the Vietnamese leaders had launched the life-squandering big Tet offensive. Its aim? To get negotiations. Now full scale talks would begin -- conditional on the leaders' promise not to launch big offensives.

But that's really no paradox. The adventurism of Tet and the opportunism of the November agreement not to "escalate" are all of a piece. They both fit a strategy of getting a deal with imperialism.

The U.S. government had plenty to celebrate. In the process of bringing about the negotiations, the NLF/DRV had led the world-wide anti-war movement away from anti-imperialism into the harmless call for "talks now." And -- their cup runneth over! -- now, even before the talks had begun, the U.S. rulers had a promise from DRV/ NLF leaders not to let things get out of hand. A no-strike pledge with a vengeance.

And, indeed, the Vietnamese leaders kept their word. They didn't launch an offensive for five months. When they did finally launch an offensive, newly-elected president Nixon warned them that such actions could jeopardize the "understanding" between DRV leaders and LBJ that had made the bombing halt possible. But as a N.Y.Times editorial pointed out to Nixon, the offensive really was no violation of the agreement. The U.S., not the NLF, was getting too pushy -- the NLF/DRV forces were only trying to discourage this risky U.S. approach. Nixon, the Times urged, should cut back his "search and destroy" missions. After all, noted the Times, hadn't the DRV pulled 20 regiments out of the south after the bomb-halt/negotiations agreement the preceding fall? Thus even this spring 1969 offensive was tied to the negotiations.

RELY ON WEAPONS/SQUANDER PEOPLE

In order to fight a war of negotiations, NLF/DRV leaders began stressing large troop concentrations and "conventional" military methods. General Giap -- who became an advocate of this approach -- stressed that this method puts special emphasis on high efficiency of all kinds of weapons and equipment. (Giap, Big Victory, Great Task, p. 54.) What had happened to the 3-stage People's War?

POLITICALLY -- Negotiations were not key. The goal was to get the "best" deal from imperialism. Tactics were geared to this. A military offensive was like a harsh diplomatic note.

STRATEGICALLY -- No more protracted approach. Reliance on weapons and expert skills replaced reliance on millions of working people.

What this means is that the guerilla character -- the mass based popular character of the war -- was more and more lost. It did not give way to the full-scale, millions-strong popular offensive of the final stage of People's War -- it was just plain lost. The people, not yet fully mobilized, were no longer viewed as key. They were squandered for effect. At one time, even the U.S. agent Douglas Pike had had to admit that:

The rural Vietnamese was not regarded (by the NLF) simply as a pawn in a power struggle, but as the active element in the thrust. He was the thrust.

This was no longer true.

U.S. officials saw this soon. They were overjoyed:

The enemy has virtually abandoned guerrilla tactics to fight a nearly conventional war. This has made less important the admitted weaknesses of U.S. and Government (Saigon puppet) troops in fighting guerrillas ... Present American military doctrine is still not well suited to fight guerrillas, many critics argue. In recent months, however, these same critics have begun to feel such faults are less important ... "Hell," said one young American with field experience, "We lost the guerrilla war in 1964. I admit that. But this is now a new war and we could win it." (New York Times, 1/3/69)

Another U.S. officer said:

"The men who attacked the U.S. Embassy (in Saigon during Tet, 1968) never showed any indication of wanting to surrender ... They were brave men. But they are dead now and you don't replace that kind of man easily." (New York Times, 1/3/69.

But the men who died at the embassy weren't just "brave individuals." They were dedicated revolutionaries. Thousands of the best, most experienced rank and file leaders were slaughtered during Tet. When you think about that -- not only from the viewpoint of human life thrown away, but when you consider that these revolutionaries were steeled in many years of class struggle -- it takes a long time for the people to bring forward such leaders. And for thousands of revolutionaries to die -- for a negotiating tactic!

What a terrible waste.

When we say the DRV/NLF leaders' negotiations strategy is a betrayal, this is not just talk. It is a crime to squander the lives of working people, revolutionaries in this way.

Vietnamese workers and peasants will not tolerate such leaders very long.

How much this terrible strategy has undermined the vast NLF base of fighting support is clear from the past year of fighting. The war merely drags on now, on and on, not allowed to develop because negotiations are key: the People's War stagnates. The NLF can, of course, go on quite some time in this way. Years were spent building a vast base of support.

This is now a war of attrition. But the oppressed never won by waiting out the rulers. And especially not when, at any time, they may be asked to die simply in order to insult a U.S. Paris negotiator or show Nixon that his shape table is unacceptable.

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