Negotiate? Or U.S. Get Out Now!

Negotiations are the most striking fact about the Vietnam war today. The talks dominate DRV/NLF leaders' strategic thinking. In this section we will consider two important questions about the negotiations: first, whether they are good for Vietnamese working people and the working class all over the world; second, how the political basis for these talks was laid. In the next chapter -- NEGOTIATIONS DRAIN PEOPLE'S .WAR -- we will relate the development of negotiations to the actual fighting in Vietnam and show how the people's forces have been undermined.

Some have argued: "All right, even though the U.S. is wrong and the war is imperialist, why do people have to attack negotiations? Why not back some more reasonable man -- a man like McCarthy -- who'd get the whole thing over with. Is it pro-imperialist' to be for peace in Vietnam?"

Many would agree with this position. And this stand often represents a real change in people's views -- from thinking the war is just, to seeing it must he opposed.

But simply opposing the war is not enough. For even it if does "all end," finally, the main question remains: Who won?

The war is not the result of irrational passions. The U.S. government knew what it was doing when it attacked the Vietnamese working people. The Vietnamese were being quite rational when they

refused to lie down and be stepped on. Peace is all well and good -- but if that were all Vietnamese workers and peasants wanted, they would never have rebelled against the 'peace U.S. imperialism installed after the Geneva negotiations in 1954.

When "the mess is all over with," will Vietnamese working people be stuck in living hell?

NEGOTIATIONS: THE U.S. GETS ONE FOOT OUT OF THE GRAVE

In discussing negotiations we should keep in mind the situation in Vietnam up to 1968, when talks began.

The imperialists were desperate to defeat people's war in Vietnam. But things weren't going well. The more troops the U.S. government sent in, the worse the situation became.

This really isn't so strange. It follows a basic law. The U.S. government was kicking the Vietnamese. The law in operation was discovered a while ago by the German communist, Karl Marx: "He who gets kicked, kicks back!"

As long as the anti-U.S. forces relied thoroughly on the people -- the ones who were getting kicked by imperialist oppression for so long -- their ability to fight imperialism increased as much as the U.S. escalated.

The more troops the U.S. government sent, the, more furiously ten million fought back. And the vivid and moving -- the heroic! -- picture of millions of working people standing up to the robber of continents, inspired tens of millions, hundreds of millions around the world, brought the oppressed shouting and fighting to their feet.

People's War -- relying on the understanding, the collective knowledge and strength of the oppressed to overthrow the class rule of their oppressors -- People's War was grinding U.S. imperialism face down in the dirt.

A majority of the elite Marine Corps had been wiped out.

U.S. strategic army reserves were nearly exhausted.

Much of the U.S. Air Force had been blown out of the sky by rifles and conventional anti-aircraft weapons.

The 'unbeatable' U.S. imperialist army with its' deadly 'enormous fire power' and devastating 'war of mobility' was getting beaten! Morale was zero. U.S. soldiers -- who did not want to fight Vietnamese working people in the first place -- were being used as bait to get NLF troops close enough 'for artillery or air strikes!

In the U.S., black rebellions occurred in over a thousand cities. Strikes were shaking the country. The economy was a mess.

It isn't surprising that the U.S. government wanted negotiations.

"DOVES" AND "HAWKS" AGREE: SAVE CAPITALISM !

"But," one might argue, "imperialism is not monolithic! When the negotiations started, didn't the liberal 'dove' politicians want the U.S. to get out?"

As we discussed earlier, the difference between "hawk" and "dove" politicians is over when to use the carrot and when (not whether) to use the stick. Both argue that workers must be kept "in their place." And, of course, "doves" like to smile when they stab you. (Thus "dovish" John F. Kennedy named a Vietnam concentration camp program "Operation Sunrise.

Let's see what the so-called "doves" had to say, in the year before negotiations actually started. Here's Robert F. Kennedy, at that time chief "dove":

Nearly all Americans share with us the determination to remain in Vietnam until we have fulfilled our commitments … (no division) will erode American will and compel American withdrawal. (New York Times, 3/3/.67; our emphasis)

McCarthy's stand was identical:

He said at Fond Du Lac that U.S. troops probably would remain in Vietnam for a "long long time" even if there is an armistice in the fighting. "I would expect there would be formal arrangements to say who would be there and in how many numbers." (Boston Herald Traveler, 3/26/68)

It would be "precipitous" to remove U.S. forces within six months of negotiations as propose by President Johnson (McCarthy said). " I think I would advise him against moving that fast," McCarthy said. "I would put the time limit at five years."(America, a Jesuit magazine, 12/16/67)

(By the way -- who was the dove, LBJ or McCarthy?????)

RFK put it most clearly when he referred to the necessity of "fulfilling our commitments." The only "commitment" the U.S. government ever made in Vietnam was to itself. That is, the U.S. government promised itself that Vietnam would be turned into a base ...-for what? A base, essentially, for its key strategy -- the defeat of workers' rule in China. What RFK and McCarthy were arguing was: (there is) no chance of a victory "by further escalation." (America, ibid.)

That is, as long as Vietnamese working people fight a People's War, these "doves" reasoned," the more we kick, the harder we'll get kicked back. Useless! The problem therefore was how to stifle People's War in Vietnam. Negotiations were the "solution."

"But," one might ask, "let's say People's War was "stifled"? What of it? What's wrong with peace ?'

PEOPLE'S WAR AND SOCIALISM? OR "PEACEFUL" OPPRESSION!

People's War is not a trick name you use when you want your side to sound good, the way John F. Kennedy called Vietnam a war "for free world virtues." People's War means workers and peasants making a revolution against terrible oppression, when the oppressor is very strong militarily. It is a very protracted revolution. Instead or relying on super-machines and forcing workers to fight other workers -- the way the U.S. government does -- instead of relying on money and guns, People's War relies on and serves the needs of THE PEOPLE: workers and peasants. It tries to turn every ability of the millions of oppressed, all their wealth of class knowledge, all their capacity to struggle together, every bit of their revolutionary anger, into a weapon. It means unleashing their creative ability to make revolution against the bankers and businessmen who try to divide and kill working people to continue exploiting them. From the oppressor's viewpoint, People's War is very "unconventional" -- it relies on the people he is oppressing. It is the exact opposite of his war -- imperialist war. People's War is working class war.

During the period of French rule, many

Vietnamese landlords and big businessmen were irritated by French stinginess towards them. They wanted a bigger share of the booty. Nevertheless, these "mandarins" never organized to drive the French out of Vietnam, never called for revolution. They feared that once the people were "let loose" they would sweep away landlords and big businessmen. And that is indeed the logic of People's War. Some consider People's War a tactic for getting a foreign oppressor out. That can be one of its effects, certainly. But the essence of People's War is socialism. For it relies -- it must rely on unleashing the class hatred of the oppressed and on vastly strengthening their revolutionary class unity.

Why should working people -- peasants and workers -- go back to the "business as usual" of getting a boot in the face after they understand, at last, that they can win?? The logic of People's War if it is allowed to develop, is that workers and peasants will seize power -- socialism! This can be thwarted -- temporarily -- for instance by confusing and misleading the people with nationalism into losing sight of class goals. But such sellouts can be only temporary.

Now, of course, People's War involves real suffering. But what good is "peace" if the old oppressors -- the imperialists, the landlords, the local businessmen -- return? Their rule means incessant suffering, dragging on and on -- until a new revolution sweeps the oppressors away.

Under the 5 years of Japanese rule in Vietnam two million starved to death. If anyone thinks this "peace" is preferable to smashing imperialism, let him consider seriously the position of a worker or poor peasant in Vietnam. We are not cold to the suffering of Vietnamese workers and peasants. But it is rotten "sympathy" that ends up handing the people to oppressors.

"But," someone could say, "isn't all war had?"

Of course war is terrible -- but how do you end war? We can only end war by smashing the rule of those who profit from and therefore make war -- the imperialists. War can only be ended through socialist revolution. Or consider this:

War in "peace time" is a constant fact of life for millions! U.S. workers who die of speed-up are Victims of the boss class's war. Latin American kids with rickets are wounded in combat.

And if a deal is worked out in Vietnam with the imperialists, what would that mean for the rest of the oppressed in the world? It would mean strengthening the U.S. government's ability to put down revolts in Asia and elsewhere, strengthen their political/military encirclement of China.

1967: NLF/DRV LEADERS BACKSLIDE

The liberal politicos used to claim they were the ones who wanted negotiations. LBJ and "hawks" like him would never negotiate, or so the "doves" said.

Except that's not the way it worked out. As the history of the last three years shows, all the imperialists -- "doves" and "hawks alike -- were willing to negotiate. The question was: when? LBJ was for holding out longer than Kennedy or McCarthy,

In any case until 1967, DRV/NLF leaders were not willing to negotiate. They scoffed at the idea. They said that our points were the precondition for talks, and the first point was that the U.S. had to withdraw from the south. Ho Chi Minh, the late DRV leader, put it this way in 1965:

Let the American imperialists cease aggression, terminate all military operations against the DRV and withdraw the U.S. troops from south Vietnam, then peace will be established at once in Vietnam. (quoted two years later in 1/1/67 New York Times)

But starting with an interview with Nguyen Duy Trinh in late January 1 967, the DRV/ NLF leaders have publicly changed their stand. Here's how Ho Chi Minh stated the new public position:

After the unconditional cessation of U.S. bombing raids and all other acts of war against the DRV, the DRV and U.S. could enter into talks and discuss questions concerning both sides. (U.S. News and World Report, 4/3/67)

Withdrawal was dropped as a precondition for talks; so were the DRV's other three points. This weakened anti imperialist forces around the world. Liberal "dove" imperialists -- who wanted negotiations to defeat Vietnamese 'workers and peasants -- were strengthened by the new policy. And assorted revisionists -- sellouts posing as reds --like the decaying "Communist" Party U.S.A. and the anti-revolutionary Russian regime -- these finks, who for years had been advising the Vietnamese to talk turkey, these counter-revolutionary mummies in red wrappings were injected with life by the Vietnamese's new "stop the bombing and negotiate" line.

Vietnamese leaders publicly praised the imperialist "doves":

Among even U.S. political circles, many well-known figures, including Senators Mansfield, Cooper, McCarthy, Kennedy, etc., have seen the right way to follow and demanded that the Johnson administration stop bombing North Vietnam so as to make talks possible. (Vietnamese News Agency, 3/1/68)

WHY LEADERS CHANGED THEIR STAND

Shortly after the Vietnamese leaders reversed their position, agreeing to negotiate if there were an unconditional bombing halt, Theodore Draper said the following about the change:

On February 8 (1967), as the military truce in Vietnam went into effect, Soviet Premier Kosygin arrived in London for talks with prime Minister Harold Wilson. On that same day, Kosygin pointedly referred to Nguyen Duy Trinh's offer to negotiate in return for a cessation of bombing, and gave it his blessing. He saw fit to offer the same advice the following day. Since the Soviet leaders had previously refrained from injecting themselves publicly into the North Vietnamese-United States negotiating problem, this deliberate repetition represented a new policy. There is reason to believe that the Soviet leaders decided to back North Vietnam's new one-point negotiating position because they had had something to do with bringing it about. According to Burchett (a pro-Russian Australian journalist), it was "open knowledge that a number of Socialist-bloc countries were urging such a move over a year ago;" but the North Vietnamese leaders had resisted....the Soviets had clearly influenced Ho Chi Minh and his colleagues to come down from their four points (New York Review of Books, May 4, 1967; our emphasis)

The Vietnamese leaders were willing to talk, but the U. S. government still wasn't satisfied. All agreed that the Russians were pressuring Hanoi and the NLF. But, as the New York Times noted, the question remained:

How much influence do the Russians really have in Hanoi? How far can they move the North Vietnamese toward a settlement? What posture by the United States would most help them to succeed? (February 11, 1967)

"How much influence do the Russians have?" That was the question. Both "hawks "and "doves" wanted a "peace" that would jibe with U.S. imperialist aims in Vietnam and East Asia The way "doves" read it, Russian political influence was already- strong enough for "profitable" negotiations. "Hawks" felt this was wishful thinking

Thus, in arguing for immediate negotiations, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., the "dove" (who had earlier backed Ngo Dinh Diem), said:

Let the burden of delivering Hanoi to the negotiating table fall on Moscow. (New York Times, 3/9/67)

But LBJ and Company delayed over a year before agreeing to preliminary talks. Why did they stall from January 1987 to early 1968 to begin preliminary talks ? Because they didn't think the NLF/DRV leaders were tame enough yet. Thus Secretary of State Dean Rusk said in reply to "dove" Kennedy:

"I don't think the problem is Kosygin's sincerity," he (Secretary Rusk) said. "The problem is Hanoi's attitude." (New York Times, 2/2/87)

"Let's talk now," said the "doves," arguing that the Russians had already done their job.

"Wait until later," answered LBJ and company. And turning to the Russian regime they added, friendly but firm: "Do better!" The Russians, scared silly that People's War might spread and increase Chinese influence (Manchester Guardian, 2/13/67) rolled up their sleeves and really went to work.

Just one year after the first public NLF/DRV back-sliding, the Vietnamese leaders announced a new stand -- or rather, a new retreat. In the beginning of 1968, Vietnamese leaders said an unconditional bombing halt would automatically lead to talks. From a diplomatic viewpoint they were begging.

Within a few months preliminary talks had begun.

Next Section: Negotiations Drain People's War

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