1965 to 1968 -- U.S. Rulers Invade

When Johnson ran as a "peace candidate" against the so-called war maniac, Goldwater, he was portrayed as a great "dove." This was a calculated lie. For in fact Johnson and the big bankers and businessmen for whom he spoke bad already decided to escalate the war to a fierce new level.

On February 7, using an NLF attack on U.S. forces at Pleiku as the excuse, The U.S. government began regular bombing of the DRV. At the same time, a vast buildup of U.S. troops in the :south began,

WHY ESCALATION?

The U.S. government claims this escalation was to meet "escalated aggression from the DRV," but U.S. leaders certainly knew that the NLF drew its strength from the people in the south. And the bombings were definitely not intended to halt the at-that-time nearly nonexistent flow of guns and men from the north (On the contrary, the bombing caused the DRV to send large-scale aid for the first time.)

Was the U.S. government crazy? Or were there reasons consistent with the course the U.S. had followed since before 1954?

The real reasons were:

1. To bolster morale in Saigon and delay NLF victory. "Special war" had been a flop. The ARVN desertion rate was ridiculous. The U.S. government hoped huge numbers of U.S. troops just might possibly (somehow) beat the NLF.

2. _To get the DRV to pressure the NLF to negotiate. The DRV would be hurt by bombing. The USSR could 'become more influential as the conflict became more complex, and they'd pressure the north. And the DRV had tremendous influence on the NLF. This second set of reasons was the key.

CAUGHT IN THE JAWS OF PEOPLE'S WAR

The history of the war from 1985 to 1988 is probably the best known to most Americans. The U.S. sent in first tens, then hundreds of thousands of troops. By mid-1968, there were about half a million U.S. troops in Vietnam. And, of course, the U.S. intensively bombed the DRV throughout this period.

What was the actual fighting like? Let's consider the first two dry seasons. (Dry season weather is favorable to U.S. government air strikes, used to cover ground actions.) During both, the U.S. launched large scale ground actions, with names like Operation Attleboro and Operation Junction City. They aimed at finding and destroying: large concentrations of "Vietcong." They failed, and U.S. government forces suffered high casualties .

Moreover, during this period NLF influence increased throughout southern Vietnam. The U.S. attempt to defeat the NLF by "pacifying" villages was a complete flop.

Thus U.S. News and World Report presented the following summation of "the truth about the war in Vietnam":

At The very moment when "smiling John" Lindsay was inside, the negotiating room "pledging" to New York prison rebellion leaders that all rebels would get "safe conduct" and not be harmed, the Mayor's cops were clubbing defenseless prisoners, as the photo proves (Of course, that's when "brave" cops really shine -- when they're got clubs and guns and outnumber an unarmed prisoner by 50 to l.) But what else could one expect from the bosses' mayor and the bosses' cops except treachery and brutality?

Prisons help the ruling class keep the lid on unemployment, racism and starvation. And when the prisoners rebel against this oppression, the bosses offer the same twin tactic as elsewhere -- first the "sweet talk" and then wham! with the billy club. When workers rule the only prisoners will be those who want to bring back the old exploitation and profit system -- and if they can't be rehabilitated to working-class way of thinking, that's where they'll stay.

Picture from Challenge, Nov. l, 1970

Out in the countryside, where American influence, is felt least, things are going worst in this war. Pacification is not only moving "slowly" as Washington reports, but in some areas the program is in- danger of outright failure. The South Vietnamese Army is still undisciplined, lacking leadership and-motivation …. (What a distorted, implicitly racist way of describing the situation! The ARVN soldiers weren't "undisciplined and lacking motivation" -- they hated the U.S. government and its ARVN. These same soldiers fought magnificently after deserting to the NLF ... ) The desertion rate is appalling. In 1967, of every 1000 troops, fewer than 750 will remain at the end of the year. Desertions from the 59-man pacification teams are growing ... Near Saigon itself, the program is stagnant.

And in the "First Corps" area--the northernmost provinces of South Vietnam:

... despite official claims to the contrary, the Marines have suffered a number of defeats ... The Marines' strategy of securing and pacifying the countryside. along the coastal plain has failed ... It has been impossible even to secure the big marine enclaves from occasional attack ...

ARVN desertions, according to the New York Times, occurred at an even greater rate than suggested by U.S. News and World Report. In 1964, according to official figures. there were 73,319 desertions; in 1965, 113,462; and in 1966, 116,406. (Quoted in Phillippe Devillers, Nation, Sept. 18, 1967.)

Now consider what New York Times reporter Charles Mohr said about NLF morale:

The most striking impression ... was the depth of the professional respect the Americans had for their enemy ... Major Beckwith called the attacking troops '"the finest soldiers I have ever seen in the world except Americans. I wish we could recruit them, he said. "I wish we knew what they were drugging them with to make them fight like that. They are highly motivated and highly dedicated." (New York Times, 10/28/65.)

The counter-revolutionary class character of the American-Saigon war effort remained unchanged. Neil Sheehan wrote in the New York Times in 1966:

Vietnamese with a stake in traditional society … cooperated with France. Now the same Vietnamese for identical reasons, cooperate with the United States ... Nguyen Cao Ky was a French pilot ... other generals in the Saigon military junta were officers or sergeants in the French colonial forces.

Where the U.S. and Saigon regained control the first thing "pacification" teams did was try to restore the land ownership and political power of the landlordrs. A Boston Globe correspondent, writing from Saigon, made this point very clearly:

ARMY HELPS LANDLORDS MILK PEASANTS

As the Vietnamese describe the war here, it looks and sounds very much like a struggle between landless peasants. in the countryside and their absentee landlords … For peasants living in areas controlled by the Vietcong the Saigon Government represents the threat that their lands will be taken away from them and their old rents exacted again ... The old landowners ... are the mainstay of the South Vietnamese Government and Army ... they are the class that supports the present social order … After the troops seize an area that the VC have held, the landowners move right in after them and even use the troops to help collect back rents. (Boston Globe, 1/8/68.)

Things were definitely getting worse for the U.S. government in Vietnam.

They must have had a very good reason for staying. And indeed they did.

The Ruling Class …

... IS the Government!

A study was made of 234 federal policy-making officials during the years 1944-1960. It excluded Presidents and included only those officials with the highest ranks. In total, people who'd come from big business, investment and corporate law held almost 60 percent of these posts. A mere 45 of them filled a third of all posts. (See Gabriel Kolko The Roots of American Foreign Policy, pp. 13-26.) In other words, the rich control this government very directly. Workers in the U.S. face the same enemy as Vietnamese workers and farmers -- a government of- businessmen who rule for businessmen.

Next section: Vietnam: An Imperialist War

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